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Here we examine the challenges to democratisation in Bahrain, with a particular focus on how the recent 2011 Uprising has resulted in a deepening of authoritarianism. It is argued that the recent unrest has brought into sharp relief the absence of 'quality' democracy in Bahrain, and that any form of democratic transition is dependent on the will of a conservative Al Khalifa-Saudi nexus. While the pro-democracy movement may have prompted minor concessions on the part of the government, the extent of the popular mobilisation triggered the Al Khalifa regime's authoritarian reflex, and they have reacted to throttle the uprising by putting in place legislative, ideological, and political barriers to reform, which points not only to a current de-democratisation, but also a lack of future democratisation. In addition to arguing for the post-2011 undoing of democracy in Bahrain, this article also points to two major barriers to future democratisation; 1) a conservative, post-Independence Al Khalifa-Saudi coalition assisted by large military resources 2) protracted communal tension brought about by the government's instrumentalisation of sectarianism. 





Introduction: The Failure of Bahrain's Revolution 

Bahrain's Uprising, which began on 14 February 2011, has gone from peaceful large scale protests involving hundreds of thousands of people, to scattered demonstrations and low-level violent confrontations between fringe groups and the police. In early 2011, when government forces shot and killed numerous protesters, members of the opposition termed by Abdulhadi Khalaf​[1]​ (2015) as the radical flanks ​[2]​ split from the main movement, escalating their demands by calling for a republic. This was in contrast to the mainstream opposition, namely Jamiʿyat al-Wifaq al-Watani al-Islamiyya (al-Wifaq), Bahrain's largest, almost exclusively Shiʿa opposition political society, who had formed an alliance with a number of other societies, including Jamiʿyat  al-ʿAmal al-Watani al-Dimoqrati (Wa'ad), a society whose roots lay in Bahrain's leftist Arab nationalist and socialist movements. ​[3]​   The relative unity of the original opposition coalition, which centred around a pro-democracy agenda, was thus fragmented due to government repression.  Since 2011, scores of leading human rights activists, religious notables, and political figures, including a group known as the 'Bahrain 13'​[4]​ (American for Democracy and Human Rights in Bahrain [ADHRB], 2015), have been arrested and tortured. In addition, thousands of citizens have been incarcerated, dozens killed, and many tortured by the state's security apparatus (Bassiouni et al, 2011). As a result of the Uprising, the government have consolidated their power, and given only minor concessions to the opposition. 
	As with the previous uprising in the 1990s, the government, dominated by the ruling Sunni Al Khalifa family, portrayed the uprising as an exogenous, Iranian-backed fifth column intent on installing Shiʿa theocratic rule (Mabon, 2013, p. 71). In the process, they have blamed exiled cleric Hadi al-Mudarrasi  for being the leader behind the 14 February Youth Coalition, Bahrain's horizontally-organized and anonymous youth movement (Bahrain News Agency [BNA], 2013).  However, while the unrest of the 1990s was mostly dealt with by Bahrain's security apparatus, and financial patronage allowed by Saudi Arabia's increasing of  Bahrain's share of oil revenue from the Abu Safah oil field (Human Rights Watch [HRW], 1997), 2011  was notable in that it necessitated intervention by the Gulf Co-operation Council Peninsula Shield Force (GCCPFS), a military alliance consisting of troops from Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Qatar. This general opposition perception of this intervention as illegitimate is reflected in the fact many refer to the GCCPFS as the 'forces of occupation' (quwāt al-iḥtilāl) (Shehabi & Jones, 2013, p. 7). However, the intervention marked the continuation of a historical trend in foreign actors preventing significant political change in Bahrain. 




In the following sections, we offer a critical examination of both Bahrain's democratic evolution and the prospects of democratic transition by; outlining Bahrain's reforms and democratic institutions; analysing the impact of the revolutionary movement on democracy; examining how the regime's​[6]​ use of sectarianism has hindered the prospects of future democratisation; and arguing for the importance of transnational containment and regional politics in influencing Bahrain's internal affairs. In addition to secondary analysis on Bahrain, evidence has been taken from a number of sources, including legislation available in Bahrain's official gazette, reports produced by NGOs such as Amnesty International, reports compiled by local NGOS such as the Bahrain Center for Human Rights, reports by agencies such as the US State Department, and reports by the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry fact-finding team. The work also draws on historical records from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office obtained at the National Archives (TNA) in Kew, as well as leaked cables from the US State Department. These historical documents are particularly useful in gaining an insight into long term trajectories influencing Bahrain's approach to internal dissent and democratisation, especially with regards to the dynamics between the ruling family and outside powers. This information is combined  to describe and explain the impact of the recent Uprising on democracy in Bahrain, and also the future prospects of a transition. 


Bahrain's Low Quality Democracy 

From Failed Experiment to Facade
Gianluca Parolin (2011) argues that while Bahrain has won a lot of international praise for its tentative democratisation, especially from US policy-makers, this has been marred by a failure to include women​[7]​ and the country's majority Shiʿa population more into political life. Bahrain  also performs poorly in measures of democratisation. In Freedom House's Index, Bahrain has gone from a high of 5 between 2003 and 2009, to the lowest point of 6.5, just shy of 7 in 2015, the lowest rating Freedom House has to offer (Freedom House, 2015a). In 2014, Bahrain did not even manage to hold 'inclusive, clean, and competitive elections' (Scheduler, 1998, p. 93), arguably the minimum standard in the road from an electoral democracy to a liberal democracy. As evidenced by the ongoing repression since 2011, it is also clear that the government has failed 'to uphold the political and civil freedoms essential for liberal democracy' (Scheduler, 1998, p. 93). Using the IDEA book on international electoral standards to determine electoral fairness, the NGO Bahrain Watch concluded that 'Bahrain’s latest election seems to be more an instrument for the government to exercise control over the people, rather than the people over the government' (Shehabi, 2014). While these figures highlight Bahrain's struggle to obey the minimum standards of an electoral democracy, they say little of what Gerardo Munck (2014) calls the 'quality' of democracy. Munck (2014, p. 13) argues that 'democracy is diminished by counter majoritarian institutions, such as (i) presidents with strong legislative powers, (ii) upper chambers with strong powers, (iii) rigid constitutions, and (iv) courts with the power of judicial review regarding matters of normal politics'. 	It follows then that the quality of democracy can be enhanced by a combination of electoral standards and civil rights, including; clean and inclusive elections; proportional representation; a unicameral parliament with legislative capacity; freedom of expression, association, assembly, and access to information; and the prevention of socio-economic inequality turning into political equality (Munck, 2014). Yet the lack of quality of Bahrain's democracy was exposed by the mere fact it was a mobiliser of unrest in Bahrain, with the opposition's fundamental demands revolving around certain key issues, including; 'an accountable Executive (elected prime minister and cabinet), a fully empowered legislature, equal representation (one person one vote), fair distribution of wealth, an end to anti-Shia discrimination, an end to political naturalisation, and an end to corruption' (Shehabi & Jones, 2015, p. 15).  
	Similar demands have been ongoing for decades. In 1973 a National Assembly was created, yet it only lasted two years before it was dissolved after the elected members refused to approve a draconian state security law put forward by the government, a move that the government saw as weakening their control while strengthening the opposition (Khuri, 1980, p. 11). However, Bahrain's recent democratic turn began in earnest in 1999, upon the death of the former ruler Shaykh ʿIsa bin Salman Al Khalifa. His son and successor, Hamad bin ʿIsa Al Khalifa, undertook a number of conciliatory gestures designed to frame himself as a progressive and democratic reformist. He permitted political prisoners to return, granted amnesty to those accused of crimes against the state before 2001, and abolished the State Security Law (International Crisis Group, 2011). The National Action Charter laid out constitutional changes that were approved by 98% of those who voted (Ulrichsen, 2011). Despite this, the King was accused of a constitutional coup after he unilaterally moved to secure the power of the Al Khalifa. Instead of an empowered and elected parliament, a bicameral system was created that 'virtually guaranteed that ultimate decision-making power remained in the palace' (ICG, 2011, p. 6). Rather than being small and merely consultative, the 40 person upper-house (Majlis al-Shura)​[8]​  appointed by the King now had oversight of the lower house.   The legislative powers of the elected body (Majlis al-Nuwab​[9]​) were, and remain limited; 'constitutional amendments require a two-thirds majority of the combined houses, rendering change virtually impossible' (ICG, 2011, p. 6). Furthermore, 'While power to pass laws rests with both chambers, the cabinet alone has the right to initiate and draft them, and the appointed Shura chamber has in effect veto power over initiatives and decisions by the elected chamber' (ICG, 2011, p.6.). The king also retains the power to rule by decree (marsūm bi-qanūn) so long as such decrees do not violate the constitution. However, the extent of the King's powers, such as the right to invoke a state of national safety, nullify rights afforded by the constitution. Judges are appointed by the King and are frequently members of the ruling family. Judges who are not members of the Al Khalifa family are often Egyptians on two years contract, and are afraid to deliver unfavourable verdicts for fear of not having their contract renewed by the government (International Commission of Jurists, 2002). As a result, neither the legal system nor the constitution are sufficiently able to protect Bahraini citizens from an arbitrary state.  
	Crucially, long standing grievances, such as the marginalisation and discrimination of the country's Shiʿa and baḥārna​[10]​ community, were deliberately circumvented rather than confronted by the reforms. This was evident in the lack of redress obtainable by Bahrain's Shiʿa population, who had largely been the targets of previous state repression. The inability to seek justice, which could have worked to aid reconciliation, was crystallized by the King's promulgation of Decree Law. No 56 of 2002, a general amnesty granted to those officials who were accused of engaging in torture and human rights violations before 2001 (Human Rights Watch, 2010).  The government's fear of empowering the country's Shiʿa majority also resulted in attempts to  ideologically shape  civil society by engineering the sectarian balance to achieve a Sunni majority. As well as removing the citizenship from mostly Shiʿa dissidents,  the government embarked on an extensive 'program of naturalizing foreign Sunnis in return for police and military service' (Gengler, 2012). The government are cagey about releasing figures, but according to Salah al-Bandar (2015), a former adviser to the Cabinet Affairs Ministry of Bahrain, the Royal Court of the Al Khalifa family may have naturalised 50,000 Sunnis per annum since 2006. There is also new evidence to suggest that the practise has been ongoing for decades. Ian Henderson, the former British head of Bahrain's Security Intelligence Services (SIS), expressed his concern to British diplomats in 1982  that the current Prime Minister, Khalifa bin Salman Al Khalifa, and the then Crown Prince, Hamad bin ʿIsa Al Khalifa (the current King),  were  illegally deporting Bahraini Shiʿa for no legal reason (Jones, 2015, p. 218). 
	More recently, this disenfranchisement of the Shiʿa has been done electorally through a process of gerrymandering. Prior to 2014, Bahrain's electoral boundaries were drawn in such a way as to minimise the impact of the Shiʿa vote. Sunni constituencies numbering only a few hundred were often given the same voting power as a Shiʿa-dominated block consisting of thousands of citizens (Desmukh, 2013).  In some cases, one Sunni vote equalled twenty-one Shi‘a votes (Desmukh, 2013).This had the corollary effect of creating sect-based societies like al-Wefaq, who capitalised on addressing Shiʿa grievances, an issue that struggled to get purchase among secular or Sunni members of society. The issue was compounded by other irregularities.  For example, the descendants of the Sunni Dawasir, a tribe expelled by the British to Saudi Arabia in 1926 for their oppression of the baḥārna,  have also been largely repatriated by the Bahraini government, with up to 20,000 of them reported to be holding dual Bahrain-Saudi citizenship permitted under a Decree Law of 2002 (Gengler, 2015, p. 45).  The Dawasir of Damman, Bahrain's informal pocket borough, were found to be voting in the Bahrain elections on the Bahrain-Saudi causeway while also obtaining housing and state benefits from the government (Bahrain Center for Human Rights [BCHR], 2002). When asked who they voted for in the elections,  a number of them mentioned that the Chief of the Dosari (Dawasir) tribe, ʿAli bin ʿIsa, told them who to vote for.​[11]​   
	In 2014, the government redrew the electoral districts to reflect better the principle of one person, one vote,  yet the now established Shiʿa Islamist society  al-Wifaq complained that it was done so in a way to disempower both them and other Sunni Islamist societies. Five opposition parties, including al-Wifaq, boycotted the elections, arguing that they would be unfair and would establish 'absolute rule in Bahrain' (BBC News, 2014). Yet while this may point to some redress with regards to sectarian gerrymandering, the regime have simply redrawn electoral lines to combat what they perceive as Shiʿa Islamism in the form of al-Wifaq, and, to a lesser extent,  Sunni Islamism in the form of the Jamiʿyat al-Minbar al-Watani al-Islami​[12]​ (al-Minbar) and the Jamiʿyat  al-Aṣala al-Islamiyya​[13]​ (al-Asala). Ultimately, the Uprising prompted a response from the government that further sought to weaken Bahrain's opposition, both through coercive repression, but also the unilateral  restructuring of civil society. This can loosely be termed as a 'de-democratisation', since it has, while maintaining a facade of electoral democracy, severely damaged its quality, at least according to Munck's conceptualisation. 


Changes Post 2011: Uncivil Society and 'De-Democratisation' 

Upon the outbreak of unrest in 2011, the Bahrain government, with a $20 billion aid package from other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) donors, attempted to subdue demands for democratic reform by offering material advantages to citizens (Laessing, 2011). Yet relying on the dispensation of 'promises of political reforms in combination with offering lavish makramāt​[14]​ to protest leaders perceived as “moderate”' (Khalaf, 2015, p. xv) simply reflected the ruling family's commitment to patronage,and not the ballot box,  as a form of governance.    In a typical carrot and stick fashion, the government reacted harshly when their incentives failed, and executed sanctions instead, including; the removal of scholarships from government-funded students studying overseas, the expulsion of  500 students from the university of Bahrain and Bahrain Polytechnic for allegedly being involved in protests,  the revocation of Bahraini citizenship from at least 72 people (BBC News, 2015),  and  the firing of approximately 2,500 people from their jobs in both the public and private sector for engaging in legal strikes (Bassiouni et al, 2011, p. 420). 

Fine-Tuning Authoritarianism with Repressive Public Policy
The only concessions given by the government were superficial reforms, including, for example,  a constitutional amendment that allowed the elected chamber to pass a vote of no confidence in the country's Prime Minister Khalifa bin Salman Al Khalifa (Law Library of Congress, 2012a). Despite this superficial constitutional change, which requires that two thirds of the elected chamber be in agreement, the King still has the final say on whether to accept the parliament's decision (Law Library of Congress, 2012a) The minor changes, which do not threaten the prerogatives  of the ruling family,  indicate that the government has already democratised to the maximum extent deemed comfortable.
	 In addition to the amendment, the government sought to appear conciliatory by launching a national dialogue. Yet the dialogue did not apportion representation in accordance with Bahrain's elected bodies, and al-Wifaq, who had 40 % of the seats in the elected chamber, were only given 5 out of 300 seats, amounting to barely 2% of the total. The opposition in its entirety were only given 35 seats (Fakhro, 2013), prompting  Al-Wifaq to withdraw on grounds of marginalisation. A second dialogue was launched by the King in 2013, although the representatives spent the majority of the time squabbling about the mechanism of the dialogue and debating why the government were independent arbiters in the process when they were accused of being responsible for ongoing rights violations (Fakhro, 2013). The second dialogue also gave a platform for sectarian sparring, with the emerging Sunni coalition consisting of Tajammuʿ al-Wahda al-Watani​[15]​ (al-Tajammuʿ) and the al-Minbar and al-Asala societies, using it as an opportunity to rebuff oppositional demands, and push forward their own 'socio-economic demands, including housing and health' (Shehabi & Jones, 2015, p. 30). Yet the specificity of these demands, and al-Minbar and al-Asala's focus on the moral degradation of the country, set their objectives apart from their mostly Shiʿa counterparts, who were focused on more systemic political change. Nonetheless,  after the deputy of al-Wifaq was charged under new anti-terror laws, the opposition unilaterally withdrew from the second dialogue. Ultimately, the structure and outcome of the dialogue demonstrated that the government were  eschewing full-scale authoritarianism by offering piecemeal forums as a response to a challenging political situation.  
	 The State of National Safety that was declared in 15 March 2011 also  highlighted the weaknesses of the constitution, which states, according to article 1d, that Bahrain is democratic and that the  people are the 'source of all powers' (Constitution of Bahrain, 2002).  The State of National Safety, and the two-tiered quasi military court system that it authorised, gave a legal pretext for the further erosion of civil rights and liberties. Those arrested under its broad mandate were tried in a court where one of the three judges was a member of the military, a Sunni-dominated body inexperienced with civil justice. Human Rights Watch  (2012, p. 3)described the courts as 'as a vehicle to convict defendants of alleged crimes stemming from the exercise of  fundamental rights of freedom of expression, association, and assembly, in violation of international and Bahraini law'. The judges showed disregard for the civil liberties of the accused, arguing that the provisions of the decree took precedent over those in the Bahrain constitution that protect a citizen's rights to free speech and association (HRW, 2012).For example, most of the evidence against the aforementioned Bahrain 13 related 'almost entirely to peaceful political activities and raised serious due process issues as well' (HRW, 2012, p. 4).   In addition, statutes were interpreted by the Military Attorney General in a way 'least favourable' to the defendants (Bassiouni et al, 2011, p. 418). Even the BICI report noted that the interpretation of the decree exceeded those stipulated by the Decree on Martial Law (Bassiouni et al, 2011, p. 418).  The National Safety Law was the ultimate legislation endorsing arbitrary law, resulting in, rule by law, instead of rule of law. Put relatively crudely, 'there cannot be democracy without the rule of law'.​[16]​ 
	Oppositional tactics also resulted in further repressive public policy, this time through parliament. Following extra judicial killings by the security forces in 2011, al-Wifaq withdrew from parliament, vacating eighteen out of forty seats, prompting bi-elections that resulted in the election of a  largely pro-government coalition who ratified, among other things, laws that gave the state even deeper powers to control political opposition (Freedom House, 2015a). Yet while al-Wifaq's point of principle may have been an attempt to win supporters among those factions more drawn to the confrontational politics of  the illegal opposition such as Tiyar al-Wafa' al-Islami, Harakat Haqq, and the Harakat Ahrar al-Bahrain al-Islami, the government capitalised on this, quickly pushing draconian legislation through the lower house in order to give some semblance of popular legitimacy to measures that  severely curtailed freedom of expression and association.​[17]​    Among the new laws were stricter rules for those accused of attacking or insulting the security forces (The Law Library of Congress, 2012b). Protests were mostly banned in the country's capital, Manama, further diminishing the visibility and effectiveness of civil disobedience in the country (Amnesty International, 2015).  The 1976 juvenile law was amended so that the parents of anyone under sixteen who took part in a public gathering would be warned on the first offence, and imprisoned or fined on the second (AI, 2013).  Amendments made to Bahrain's anti-terrorism law  in 2013 and 2014 are also so severe as to undermine Bahrain's obligations under Article 9 of the ICCPR, which require the authorities to bring those arrested promptly before a judge or legal officer for trial (BCHR, 2014). Under the new law, the authorities can hold suspected terrorists up to six months without trial, and hold detainees up to 28 days without being charged. Penalties for insulting the King and even the Bahraini flag have been made more severe, and now those found guilty can be jailed for up to seven years (Reuters, 2014). The government even penalised the seemingly trivial, making the importation of V for Vendetta masks illegal (Mustin, 2013).  

Throttling Civil Society
 As well as the emergence of this repressive public policy, the Uprising also saw the government enact increasingly stringent controls on civil society organizations and institutions seen as  challenging to the status quo.  Within Bahrain's increasingly anti-democratic and repressive legal framework, the advocacy undertaken by many of Bahrain's NGOs prompted the government to undo previously limited privileges. Human Rights Watch (2013) noted that, 'the Ministry of Social Development has far exceeded international standards in its restrictive scope', while the US Department of State (2011) argued that the government 'routinely exploited its oversight role to stymie the activities of NGOs and other civil society organizations'.  This is undertaken through the 'arbitrary rejection of registration applications and intrusive governmental supervision of NGOs; takeover and in some cases dissolution of organizations whose leaders have criticized government officials or their policies; considerable limits placed on the ability of groups to fund raise and receive foreign funding' (HRW, 2013). One Bahraini activist noted that the object was 'to interfere, restrict, and attempt to control the activities of civic organizations' (HRW, 2013). As Wiktorowicz (2000, p. 49) notes about the Middle East, 'the state attempts to limit the possibility of collective action in the niches of society by requiring that all group work is performed in the open through civic society organizations ...within the reach of administrative practises'.
	The government have also attempted to project the illusion of civil society to the international community through the use of co-opted agents or loyal opposition figures, who, to varying extents, operate on terms agreed by the government. Many of these people head up 'front SMOs', that 'actually represent the status quo's interest but that maintain the veneer of a challenger'  (Davenport, 2015, p. 27) in order to compete with the threatening organization, and convince others the issue is being dealt with on official terms. While claiming to be independent, these organizations are 'funded directly or indirectly by the Bahraini government' (Bhatia and Shehabi, 2015, p. 126). They include the 'Bahrain Human Rights Watch Society, Bahrain Monitor, and the Manama Centre for Human Rights' (Bhatia and Shehabi, 2015, p. 126).  These GONGOs (government-owned non-governmental organizations)have served to legitimise the government's rhetoric on its commitment to human rights while at the same time worked to aid repression. In 2013 three of these GONGOS ​[18]​ contributed to a witch-hunt by publishing the photos of well-known and internationally respected human rights activists, saying that they were responsible for terrorism (BCHR, 2013). Thus  Bahrain's civil society, a theoretically crucial component of a high quality democracy, only exists in so far as to provide the illusion of a free civil society, especially in international arenas such as the UN Universal Periodic Review, where Bahraini GONGOS lobby for Bahrain's progress in both civic and human rights (Bhatia and Shehabi, 2015). 
	The Uprising was also an opportunity for the government to dismantle the General Federation of Bahrain Trade Unions (GFBTU),  Bahrain's large umbrella trade union, which was created following the reforms of the early 2000s. Amy Austin Holmes (2015) notes the importance of the GFBTU in mobilising workers during the uprising, and  argues that dismantling it was crucial in repressing the uprising. GFBTU leaders were  targeted, diminishing the organizational capacity of workers and their ability to withdraw labour power. Instead of espousing democratic rights, laid off workers now concerned themselves with protesting for the reinstatement of jobs. Amendments to the trade union law also weakened the union's bargaining power, and now only unions chosen by the Ministry of Labour can represent Bahraini workers in national and international bargaining (International Trade Union Confederation 2011). The amendment also included a clause that the International Trade Union Confederation (2011) argued would prevent trade union leaders convicted of actions leading to the dissolution of a trade union (e.g.  leading strikes in 2011) from being elected for five years following the date of their conviction. 
	In order to further dismantle the union, the government adopted a crude slight of hand. A rival union was created in 2012. Initially called the Bahrain  Labour Union Free Federation, which resulted in the comical acronym 'BLUFF' (Law, 2012), the group  soon changed its name to the less amusing Bahrain Free Labour Unions Federation (BFLUF)​[19]​. Cathy Feingold​[20]​  described it as an 'absolutely blatant attempt to split the union movement' (Law, 2012). Critics such as Khalil Bohazza, a Bahraini labour activist, believed that the new movement would weaken Bahrain's previously 'opposition-dominated' unions (al-Hasan, 2012) and result in unions based on sect. These fears were compounded by the fact one of the main leaders in BFLUF was alleged to have been the one who orchestrated the mass layoffs of striking workers in 2011 (Ahmad, 2014).  The weakening of Bahrain's trade unions represents a significant undoing of the democratic achievements gained by generations of Bahraini opposition.

Counter Mobilization: Sectarianism and Social Media

In addition to these moves designed to limit mobilisation and challenges, the government has exacerbated existing sectarian cleavages in a manner that will further reduce the possibility of future quality democracy.  In a society with higher ethnic fractionalization, 'parliamentarism can exacerbate political violence' (Selway & Templeman, 2012, p. 1571).   As Fuad Khuri (1981) observed three decades ago, the Al Khalifa regime oppose those groups that cross the sectarian divide in order to unite against them.  Pursuing fractionalization, the government have implemented this 'sectarianism as security political strategy' (Gengler, 2012) in a number of ways, including by destroying numerous Shiʿa religious buildings in 2011, a move that provoked religious sensibilities and angry rhetoric from Iran and Bahraini Shiʿa. Despite this, the government continue to blame Shiʿa sympathises such as  Iran and Hezbollah for the unrest, and have invoked numerous accounts of Iranian aggression, yet failed to provide evidence for them (Jones, 2015).   Ibrahim Sharif, the secular and Sunni head of Wa'ad was arrested and tortured​[21]​ by the government, a move intended to make the Uprising seem exclusively Shiʿa and sectarian. Citizens  espousing unity have likewise been targeted; 'even the well-intentioned leader of an online campaign (using the Twitter hashtag #UniteBH: ‘Unite Bahrain’) was arrested and interrogated by the authorities for his role in trying to cross the political divide' (Shehabi & Jones, 2015, p. 29).  Security services have also harassed people for similar reasons; 'One person reported that she was ridiculed at a checkpoint by security officers for having a “No Sunni, No Shiʿa, Just Bahraini” badge about her person' (Shehabi & Jones, 2015, p. 29). 
 	The government's sectarian strategy was complimented by the repression of freedom of speech and criticism. Netizens have been arrested, journalists tortured and killed, and criticism punished harshly (Reporters Without Borders, 2013). Bahraini authorities throttled services such as Skype, Whatsapp and Viber ahead of the Tamarrud (rebellion) protests on 14 August 2013 (Freedom House, 2014). Technologies such as FinSpy have been used to reveal the identity of critics of the regime, resulting in the imprisonment of activists for charges as trite as insulting the King. State propaganda sought to exploit the emerging oppositional information vacuum and turn public opinion against the protest movement by emphasising it as a violent, Iran-sponsored group intent on installing a Shiʿa theocracy. A frame analysis conducted by Bahrain Watch (2012a) highlighted a number of tropes used to demonise the protesters. These included; that opposition protesters are wolves in sheep’s clothing who are using calls for democracy as a cover to hide the fact that they are backed by Iran and wish to install a Shi‘a theocracy; the February 14th Youth Movement in particular are violent radicals; the opposition's values are backward and conservative; and they are sectarian. These themes were evident both in national media, and the output of mostly Washington and London-based PR firms, who were paid around $32 million to whitewash Bahrain's human rights abuses (Bahrain Watch, 2012a).  
	Statements by Shaykh ʿIsa Qasim, a Bahraini Shiʿa cleric and the spiritual leader of al-Wifaq, were also manipulated by state media. In particular, a speech in which he said that people should 'crush' (isḥaqūhum) the security services was framed by the regime as the moment that created a unilateral shift to violence among the opposition. His speech was even used in court by one policeman injured in an attack in the village of al-Eker as evidence pointing to the reason for oppositional violence (Zahra, 2012). While continued brutality by the security forces was most likely the catalyst for increasing fringe violence,  the regime used Qasim's anger and frustration to legitimise their discourse that Bahrain's opposition would use democracy to install a Shiʿa theocracy. This further tied into the regime's mantra that the Al Khalifa were a moderate and secular bulwark to theocratic and sectarian extremism (Whitaker, 2014), a tactic that has succeeded in a climate fuelled by increased fears of global Islamic terrorism.
	Yet while the above tropes in state-controlled media and international PR were prevalent,  social media also played a crucial role in the mobilisation of sectarian rhetoric and counter-revolutionary forces (Jones, 2013). In a small country like Bahrain with high internet penetration, social media was used by the regime and its loyalist supporters as a tool of intimidation and surveillance. Pro-government vigilantes on Twitter and Facebook reported friends to the authorities simply for appearing at the Pearl Roundabout (the symbolic home of the Uprising). Sectarian arguments, initially not obvious in state media, began to be mobilised in mosques and on social networks. Twitter accounts, like @7areghum, 'set the tone for sectarian discourse on social media and frequently deployed anti-Shiʿa terminology such as majuˉ si, rawaˉ fid. , safawi, and walad al-mutʿa'.​[22]​ The suspicion that @7areghum was government-run was reinforced by a number of reports, including an investigation by Bahrain Watch that revealed that the government were running extremist accounts that used sectarian rhetoric to promote discord and polarisation (Marczak, 2013). Hundreds of anonymous accounts flooded social media with pro-government messages, re-tweeting links to government propaganda and PR, a tactic that became especially virulent upon the arrest and subsequent sincing of dissident voices. Many others were bullied and intimidated by 'Twitter thugs', and stopped Tweeting or even  left the country as a result (Jones, 2013). 

From Top-Down to 'Bottom-Up' Control 
The government's 'sectarianizing' of the uprising prompted a corollary mobilization that abetted the government's repressive measures, highlighting that it is not only the relative will and capacity of the security apparatus that is important in upholding authoritarian rule, but the expansion of society to perform security and control functions. Baltajiyya​[23]​, were evident in mixed sect areas, and used to spark communal conflict (Shehabi & Jones, 2015). The state's discriminatory recruitment policy in the police meant that police violence was inevitably a Sunni against Shiʿa affair, further exacerbating tensions and divisions. This, coupled with an increased mobilisation of people lobbying on behalf of the security services, created an increasingly tense stand-off between Sunni and Shiʿa citizens. This was 'demonstrated when hundreds of pro-regime sup​porters formed a society to defend the interests of police accused of committing crimes during the unrest' (Jones, 2015, p. 232).  New pro-Sunni groups, such as the I'tilaf Shabab al-Fatih, themselves a reaction to what they saw as escalating Shiʿa demands, especially from the Alliance for a Republic, demanded an end to oppositional violence that was harming Bahrain's reputation and economy (Ulrichsen, 2012). In one instance, a group of anti-opposition Bahrainis marched to the Shiʿa village of al-Eker after a bomb attack killed a policeman (Jones, 2012a). While the police dispersed it, no one was arrested or charged, even though CCTV footage showed policemen and crowd members looting a local cold store (Jones, 2012b). The opposition were faced with the realisation that continued demands for reform could further provoke retaliations and escalations. The counter mobilization also highlighted the limited ability of the government to control those whom it had mobilised.
	 By seeking to  harness Sunni solidarity in face of an exaggerated Shiʿa threat, the regime  unleashed forces inimical to the emergence of a future shared national consensus on reform, especially considering that such reform would involve empowering a section of society portrayed as an existential threat. By playing the sectarian card 'the perceived threat of a Shiʿa takeover has become so intense that many of those traditionally loyal to the regime see any compromise with the opposition as a threat to national security... [and] attempts by moderates within the regime to move towards political compromise are compounded by the need to appease loyalists, who are increasingly advocating a more punitive approach to policing and justice' (Jones, 2015, p. 233) . The extent of grievances in Bahraini society are becoming so acute  that compromise may only be achieved after protracted conflict leads to the attrition of all parties. The pursuit of this sectarian, security-oriented policy, with extreme conservatives at the helm, has preserved Al Khalifa dominance at the cost of stability.  Such a tactic has featured heavily in Bahrain's history, and was resurrected after Bahrain's Independence in 1971. As Robert Tesh (1974a)​[24]​ noted in 1974, the 'rulers are deliberately encouraging the Right (particularly the Religious group) to react against the Left'. Nowadays, those same leaders have done the same, but between Sunni and Shiʿa, as opposed to religious elements and leftists. If we are to assert, as Gregory Gause (2014) does, that there is a cold war between Riyadh and Tehran, and that Bahrain is a proxy for this war (Mabon, 2012), driving wedges between different sects will only exacerbate future democratic transition. 


The Saudi Al-Khalifa Anti-Democratic Nexus

This lack of willingness to enact substantive democratic reforms, and the aforementioned tactics pursued to maintain the status quo, stem  from a generally shared consensus among the Al Khalifa ruling family that they must maintain a monopoly on the state's distributive capacity in order to enjoy their historic position of  privilege, a position that is based on land ownership and significant wealth accrued through oil royalties.  As Roger Tomkys​[25]​(1982a) stated, the 'Al Khalifa intend to continue to control Bahrain themselves. The way in which the Amir and his family spend their funds will certainly be off limits'. This protectiveness has been enabled by the Al Khalifa's reliance on its guardians, previously Britain and now Saudi Arabia. Such a lack of true autonomy reflects the fact that Bahrain 'cannot be an independent actor in the international arena. Whether Bahrain wills it or not, by its very location it will be caught in the squeeze of international politics' (Nakhleh, 2011, p.111). Drawing on Krasner's (1998) notion of 'organized hypocrisy', Ala'a Shehabi (2013) notes that outside powers constantly intervene in Bahrain's Affairs and thus the notion of sovereignty in Bahrain is hypocritical.  As Tomkys (1982b) put it succinctly in 1982, 'Bahrain does not enjoy the independence needed to be revolutionary'. 
	While Eva Bellin (2012) argues that, prior to the Arab Uprisings there has been a general lack of popular mobilisation in the Arab world, which contributes to the lack of democratisation,  this is not true in Bahrain. Mass mobilisation has occurred throughout Bahrain's modern history, yet foreign actors have always intervened to prevent potential threats to the Al Khalifa regime.  For example, in 1956, when Bahrain was still under British protection, Britain put marines on the ground to help the Bahraini police contain a cross-sect and populist uprising led by the Committee of National Union. In 1965, helicopters from the British Royal Navy dropped tear gas on protesters (Jones, 2015). The Bahrainis even asked the Americans in 1981 to make sure a US warship was docked in Bahrain  to deter potential subversives following the discovery of a coup plot (Tomkys, 1981). Indeed, Amy Austin Holmes (2014) argues that the United States' need for a base in Bahrain contributed to the demise of the National Assembly in 1975, and thus also contributed to  Bahrain's de-democratization. Yet ultimately, Bahrain's pre- and post-independence reliance on its protectors can be summed up in the following quotes; 'The Ruler wouldn't last a day  without the British' (British Political Agency, 1963)  but also, 'revolution is unlikely to succeed as long as the Kingdom of Saudi remains intact' (Tomkys, 1982b).  
	Although Britain had prevented democracy in the 1950s, in the 1960s and the 1970s, they began to emphasise the need for more democratisation as a form of counter-revolutionary insurance, and urged for popular representation and 'constitutional reforms' to 'guard against revolution' (Sterling, 1970). Yet while successive British political administrators had initially rejected, but eventually encouraged the idea of democracy, the shift to Saudi influence following Bahrain's Independence in 1971 contributed to increased authoritarianism. The British feared that the new Saudi Al Khalifa alliance would bode ill for democratic progress in Bahrain, stating that 'Saudi Arabia, though an immensely powerful friend, is too rich, too Islamic, and too close for comfort' (Tomkys, 1982b).
	While the British had crystallised Al Khalifa rule under their protection, they had, to some degree, tempered their authoritarian reflex (Jones, 2015), especially with regards to their treatment of the indigenous baḥārna. Saudi influence, both pragmatic and ideological, has undone the tentative steps towards democratisation. Even the creation of the National Assembly in 1973, itself driven forward by the then Amir Shaykh Isa bin Salman Al Khalifa against the wishes of his more conservative relatives such as the Prime Minister (Tesh, 1974b), was mindful of Saudi Arabia's fear of democracy.  As Robert Tesh  (1973) stated; 'The aim of the Al-Khalifah [sic] inner circle was to delegate sufficient power to the people to satisfy them that its intentions were genuine, but not to concede so much that the administration would be  hamstrung, or rash measures forced on it, or powerful neighbours antagonised, or the position of the Al Khalifa irredeemably undermined'. Despite the mechanisms that protected the Al Khalifas, Saudi Arabia were fearful that an elected parliament in Bahrain could prompt similar demands in Saudi, in a sort of democratic domino effect.  Indeed, Bahrain was Saudi's 'Achilles heel' (Tomkys, 1983), which would explain why three hundred 'kindred tribesmen' came from Saudi Arabia in 1974 to join the Bahrain Defence Force.​[26]​ 
	Saudi's keenness to secure favour was also evident in its provision of 'grotesquely expensive sports facilities to please some of the younger shaykhs', gifts that were most likely 'conditional on the abandonment of [democratic] experiments which might prove dangerous to the Al Sa'ud as well as to the Al Khalifa' (Given, 1976). The American Embassy (1975) in Bahrain too noted how it was 'Saudi displeasure at Bahrain's parliamentary experiment' , that preceded Saudi agreement 'to help finance certain economic reforms and development schemes' (Ibid.), indicating that such goals were pursued in order to mitigate demands for democracy.  This trend was evident across the Gulf. As the British official Ivor Lucas (1977) noted,  'all the traditional regimes in the Gulf are becoming increasingly dependent on Saudi support and that they must to a greater or lesser extent accept what goes with it.'  Declining British influence, both politically, and in the security apparatus, also increased a reassertion of Al Khalifa authority in matters of internal policy. 
	Although Saudi pressure on Bahrain preceded the Iranian Revolution, the fear of Shi‘a subversion prompted the question of democracy to be firmly sidelined in 1980, when the government insisted that there would be no return to parliamentary life in the near future (Walker, 26 October 1980).  The Prime Minister, who was firmly in control by the 1970s, was 'reluctant to defy King Faisal' of Saudi Arabia, and thus likely toed their line on stonewalling democratisation (Sterling, 1971).  Following the 1982 coup attempt by the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain (IFLB), Saudi and Bahrain signed a security agreement, formalising Saudi's commitment to protecting Bahrain. Yet while the Saudi-Iran rivalry was highly visible, it was the potential empowerment of the Shiʿa in Iraq, and not just Iran, that had been the Bahrain government's main concern. Paraphrasing Sir Geoffrey Arthur, the British official  P.R.H Wright (1983) stated that 'the Bahraini ruling family were far less worried by the direct influence which Khomeini and the Iranian revolution might have on the Shiʿa majority in  Bahrain than by the risk of the installation of a Shiʿa government in Baghdad'. This was primarily on account that the Shiʿa of Iraq were Arabs, and not Persians, thus binding them closer in terms of primordial identity. Indeed, British officials in the Bahrain security services noted that any support for  Khomeini was marginal. 
	
 A Perpetual Hard Line
Although Hamad's reforms of 2001 provided sufficient safeguards to ensure continued Al Khalifa hegemony, the mutual Saudi-Al Khalifa fear of emboldening the Iraqi Shiʿa increased following the US-led coalition's invasion of 2003. Democratisation and the empowerment of the Shiʿa under Nour al- Maliki, Iraq's former Prime Minister, augmented the Gulf monarchies' concerns of what King Abdulla of Jordan described as a rising 'Shia crescent' (Black, 2007). Indeed, while Jane Kinninmont (2012, p. 1)  notes that the 2011 unrest shifted power in the country 'towards a more hardline, security-oriented' grouping of the Al Khalifa family, Shiʿa empowerment in Iraq had already prompted conservative elements in the ruling core to further increase their efforts to undermine the state's tentative democratisation.  Through their personal relationships with  King Hamad, anti-opposition and anti-Shi‘a hardliners in the ruling family, especially the Khawalid​[27]​, have been working since at least 2006 to '”throttle” civil society' by advocating for the clamping down of such groups (Monroe, 2006).   Former U.S. Ambassador to Bahrain, William Monroe (24 May 2006) noted, 'Sources also indicate that royal court elements have had a direct hand in a scathing press campaign launched by Arabic daily Al Watan against NDI, other NGOs, and even the U.S. Embassy.' Members of the Royal Court were also implicated in the naturalisation scandal unearthed by Salah al-Bandar.	




From Pressure to Intervention
While conservative Al Khalifa members are influential in resisting democratisation in Bahrain,  the inevitable consequences of such resistance are discontent. The resulting agitation in 2011, and the Saudi-led intervention that it necessitated, indicate that the Al Khalifa's are not the sole guarantors of their own survival. Yet how important was this intervention in preventing deep-rooted political reform? Bahrain's security forces are large considering Bahrain's size, and include the National Guard, the Public Security Forces, the Police, and the Bahrain Defence Force. They are also 'patrimonially linked to the monarch (by family and sect), and primordially distinct' (Bellin, 2012, p.134), from the mostly Shiʿa protesters.  While part of the security apparatus's ability to confront popular mobilisation to defend the status quo was due to the fact that the majority are either Sunni Bahrainis, or Sunni mercenaries from other Arab or Muslim Countries, this loyalty or resilience cannot simply be assumed by patrimonialism and sectarian ties alone. For example, the cross sect co-operation  evident at the beginning of the uprising challenged the Sunni versus Shiʿa binary. However, when Muhammad al-Buflasa, a Sunni and former army officer was arrested and imprisoned by the government for supporting the demands for reform, it was clear that other 'defectors' wishing to cross the sectarian divide might face similar punishment (Gengler, 2012). Therefore, it is not enough, as Eva Bellin (2012, p. 134) argues, to say that patrimonialism is the reason the army 'did not hesitate to shoot' at protesters. Despite modern equipment, modern training, and high morale bolstered  by impunity for those officials accused of human rights violations in the recent Uprising (Jones, 2015),  a Saudi, Emirati and Qatari coalition of approximately 5,000 armed troops was still required to invade Bahrain in order to assist the Bahrain security forces. Evidently, the scale of Bahrain's mobilisation outstripped the ability of the authorities to tackle it without recourse to outside help.





Seen within a regional context, Bahrain's modern tribal clientelism reflects the influence of Saudi Arabia, who execute their will via an Al Khalifa ruling-core dominated by conservatives. While the regime have created legislative, procedural, and coercive barriers to the emergence of democracy, the instrumentalisation of sectarianism and the discrimination against Shiʿa will  lessen the likelihood of future transition due to increased animosity between polarized groups. Thus Bahrain's revolution failed not because of a lack of popular mobilisation, nor an excessively capable local security force, but ultimately because of Saudi intervention and sectarianism as ideological warfare. 
	Without Saudi support, the Al Khalifa may be forced to negotiate a social contract that provides more concessions and power to the ruled, yet this seems far off. Saudi intervention in Yemen, and their recent execution of the Shiʿa cleric Shaykh Nimr Al-Nimr (BBC, 2016), highlight that the Kingdom, under the new leadership of King Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud, are more likely to appease an 'ultraconservative and puritanical Wahhabi clerical establishment' (Sokolsky, 2016) by pursuing a foreign policy of Shiʿa containment.    There is little evidence therefore to suggest that within the Al Khalifa-Saudi nexus there exists any genuine intention to move towards quality democracy, especially given that EU and US's democracy promoting agenda is itself 'muted by the strategic interest in containing Iran' (Hassan 2015, p. 479).
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^1	 	Arabic names have been translated according to IJMES, except in cases where authors commonly use other spellings when transliterating their own name. 
^2	 	These include Tiyar al-Wafa' al-Islami, Harakat Haqq, and the UK-based Harakat Ahrar al-Bahrain al-Islami. Together, these are referred to as the Alliance for a Republic. 
^3	 	Other parties in the 'legal' opposition include Jamiʿyat al-Minbar al-Dimoqrati al-Taqaddumi, al-Jamiʿyat al-Qawmi al-Dimoqrati, and Jamiʿyat al-Akha' al-Watani
^4	 	This figure was originally 21, but one of those convicted was released, while seven were tried in absentia. 
^5	 	This 'failure' does not make the Bahrain Uprising a non-event. As Asef Bayat (2015) argues, what the Uprisings challenged traditional hierarchies of power, whether gender-based or generational.
^6	 	In this paper, Abdulhadi Khalaf's (1998) definition of regime is used: It describes a 'despotic form of rule that has gradually evolved in the British-designed political and economic reforms of in the first decades'.
^7	 	This paper does not focus on the position of women specifically, but the general prospects of democratic transition and issues of sectarian discrimination. 
^8	 	Translation: Consultative Council 
^9	 	Translation: Council of Deputies
^10	 	The baḥārna are the almost exclusively Shiʿa, indigenous inhabitants of Bahrain. They were, until the British-led reforms of the 1920s, severely oppressed by the Al Khalifa regime.
^11	 	Ibid. 
^12	 	A society commonly associated with the Muslim Brotherhood. 
^13	 	 Bahrain's Salafist society. 
^14	 	Literally ,'gifts' or benevolence.
^15	 	Al-Tajammuʿ, often referred to in English as the National Unity Gathering, is a loyalist-leaning society that emerged in 2011 as a counter to the mainstream opposition. 
^16	 	 Farrajoli, cited in G.L. Munck, 2014. 
^17	 	Existing laws already regulate people's right to freedom of association, expression, and peaceful assembly. For example, the 'Public Gathering Law of 1973 and the Press Law of 2002, also unduly restrict the activities of political societies as they relate to freedom of assembly and expression'. See HRW, 2013. While existing legislation is restrictive enough, the new moves reflect an entrenchment of authoritarianism, and the emergence of increasingly repressive public policy.
^18	 	Bahrain Human Rights Watch Society, Karama Human Rights Society, and Gulf European Center for Human Rights
^19	 	See the Bahrain Free Trade Union Federation's website http://www.bflufbh.com/main/index.php/en/ 
^20	 	Cathy Feingold is the director of the international department for the AFL-CIO, the American Trade Union Federation/ 
^21	 	Sharif's torture is documented in pp. 432-473 of Bassiouni et al, 2011. 
^22	 	Majūsi, meaning Zoroastrian, is a derogatory term often used by Sunnis to describe Shi‘a. Rawāfiḍ, meaning rejecter, is often used by Sunnis to mean one who rejects the true Islamic authority and leadership.   Ṣafawi is another term derogatory term directed Shi‘a – it comes from 'Safavid, the Iranian dynasty that made the state religion of Iran Shi‘a Islam.  Walad/abna' al mut'a literally means children of mut'a. Muta'a is a type of temporary marriage that many Muslims  argue is immoral.
^23	 	Arabic for 'thugs', the term has come into common parlance since the Arab Uprisings. It is generally used to describe either suspected plain clothes police, or vigilantes who support the government. See for example, Stein, E. (2011). An Uncivil Partnership: Egypt's Jama'a Islamiyya and the state after the jihad . Third World Quarterly (Special Issue: Political Civility in the Middle East), 32 (5), pp. 863 – 881. doi: 10.1080/01436597.2011.578958
^24	 	Robert Tesh was the UK Ambassador to Bahrain from 1972-75. 
^25	 	Roger Tomkys was the UK Ambassador to Bahrain from 1981-84. 
^26	 	 R.M. Tesh, Bahrain: Annual Review for 1974, 2 January 1975, FCO 8/2414. TNA.
^27	 	Khawalid is a pluralisation of the name Khalid. The term is used to refer to a branch of the Al Khalifa family descended from Khalid bin Ali Al Khalifa (1853 – 1925). Khalid bin Ali was the half-brother of Isa bin Ali Al Khalifa, who ruled Bahrain between 1869 and 1923.  Khalid bin Ahmad Al Khalifa, the Royal Court Minister and Khalifa bin Ahmad Al Khalifa, the Commander in Chief of the Bahrain Defence Force 
^28	 	The BDF, who were given powers of arrest pursuant to the State of National Safety, were accused of torture, and found by the BICI report to have killed at least 2 civilians (Bassiouni et al,  2011, 223). 
